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Particularly in the latter half of the nineteenth century sensorial experi-
ences changed at breakneck speed. Social and technological developments 
of modernity like the industrial revolution, rapid urban expansion, the ad-
vance of capitalism and the invention of new technologies transformed 
the field of the senses. Instead of attentiveness, distraction became preva-
lent. It is not only Baudelaire who addressed these transformations in his 
poems, but they can also be recognized in the works of novelist Gustave 
Flaubert and painter Edward Munch. By means of the work of William 
James, Walter Benjamin, Siegfried Kracauer and Georg Simmel, the reper-
cussions of this crisis of the senses for subjectivity will be discussed.
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In Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth 
Century (1990) and in Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and 
Modern Culture (1999), American art historian Jonathan Crary discusses 
crucial changes in the nature of perception that can be traced back to the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Focusing on the period from about 
1880 to 1905 he examines the connections between the expansion of met-
ropolitan cities such as Paris and Berlin, the dramatic expansion and indus-
trialization of visual and auditory culture, and the transformation and mod-
ernization of subjectivity. Crary approaches these issues through analyses 
of works by three key modernist painters: Manet, Seurat and Cézanne, who 
each engaged with the disruptions, vacancies and rifts within the perceptual 
field. At the core of his project is the paradoxical nature of attention. Each 
artist in his own way discovered that sustained attentiveness, rather than 
fixing or securing the world, leads to perceptual disintegration and loss of 
presence, and each used this discovery as the basis for a reinvention of rep-
resentational practices.
Crary does not discuss the work of Edward Munch, although Munch is 
also a modernist painter whose representational practice could be understood 
as engaging with the disruptions and vacancies within the perceptual field, 
and as reflecting or embodying in his works a new, modern notion of subjec-
tivity. In this article, I will not do what Crary has omitted to do, and substan-
tiate his argument on modernity in an analysis of Munch’s works. What I will 
do in what follows is elaborate on the kind of modern subjectivity that came 
about in response to the transformations of the perceptual field that were 
caused by modernity. In consequence of that analysis I will make a suggestion 
for how this account of the modern subject in relation to the perceptual field 
opens up a different understanding of Munch’s style of painting.
In his Remnants of Song: Trauma and the Experience of Modernity 
in Charles Baudelaire and Paul Celan, American literary scholar Ulrich 
Baer defines the essence of modernity as the experience of shock, of ex-
periences that register as unresolved, of traumatic experiences that elude 
memory and cognition (1). Charles Baudelaire and Paul Celan are for him 
major figures who mark the beginning and ending of modernity. Baude-
laire first recognized the dissolution of experience that characterizes 
modern existence. Although his confrontation with the “small shocks 
of urban existence” pale in comparison to Celan’s efforts to testify to 
the Holocaust, both Baudelaire and Celan inscribe the historical events 
they were part of as “shocking and traumatic because they occurred in 
complete isolation and as absolute breaks with the belief systems that 
grounded their worlds” (8).
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This diagnosis of modernity sounds perhaps far-fetched, but it be-
comes more convincing when found reflected in the observations of 
a writer who is associated neither with the revolutionary changes in Paris-
ian urban life nor with the catastrophe of the Holocaust, namely John Rus-
kin. In 1856, a year before Baudelaire published Les Fleurs du Mal, Ruskin 
understood the paintings of Victor Turner in relation to the modern man’s 
decreasing graspability of the world as caused by the increasing industriali-
zation and consumption of coal:
Out of perfect light and motionless air, we find ourselves on a sudden 
brought under sombre skies . . . and we find that whereas all the pleasure 
of [earlier days] was in stability, definiteness, and luminousness, we are 
expected to rejoice in darkness, and triumph in mutability; to lay the 
foundation of happiness in things which momentarily change or fade, 
and to expect the utmost satisfaction and instruction from what it is 
impossible to arrest, and difficult to comprehend. (Ruskin 317)
It is in modernity, however, that this vanishing of the “experience-
ability” of the world has repercussions for the experiencing subject. This 
becomes very clear, for instance, in Rainer Maria Rilke’s The Notebooks 
of Malte Laurids Brigge (Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge) of 
1910. In the years covered by the notebooks, the narrator attempts to gain 
some control over the sensory impressions that initially threaten to over-
whelm him. He experiences this invasion of sensory stimuli most strongly 
in the city. In Paris he is literally bombarded by acoustic stimuli:
Electric trams go clanging through my room. Cars run over me. A door 
slams. Somewhere a  windowpane crashes down and I  hear the larger 
shards laugh and the smaller splinters giggle. Then suddenly, a dull muf-
fled sound from the other side, inside the house. Someone is climbing 
the stairs. Comes, keeps on coming. Arrives, stays there a  long time, 
then goes on up. And then the street again. A girl screams: Ah tais toi, je 
ne veux plus. The tram races in, rattling with excitement, and then rattles 
on, over everything. Someone shouts, People walk hard, catch each other 
up. A dog barks. (Rilke 8)
Rilke personifies Malte’s acoustic experiences—shards that laugh and 
splinters that giggle—transforming the sounds into active agents threat-
ening to overwhelm the protagonist. It is as though the car is riding over 
him and the excess of acoustic stimuli makes it impossible for him to take 
90
Ernst van Alphen
any distance or reflect on anything. He literally registers everything and, 
deprived of the capacity for reflection, loses any secure sense of himself.
The main character in this novel threatens to go under, due to the 
sensory impressions that assault him in the modern city. Stimuli penetrate 
his body by way of his senses, and threaten his self with disintegration. 
The border between him and his external reality disappears. The subject 
(or disintegration of it) presented here is no longer defined by reason, but 
by his senses. In Rilke’s novel this situation is experienced as negative. The 
thrust of the novel, then, consists of the search for remedies against this 
feeling of being completely overwhelmed by sensory impressions.
Rilke’s narrator can be seen as exemplary for a new view of subjectiv-
ity and bodily experience that became increasingly important during the 
course of the nineteenth century. According to this view, rationalism and 
cognition is no longer the foundation of subjectivity and the senses are 
no longer the instruments by which the rational subject can dominate 
its environment; on the contrary, subjecthood is formed in reaction to 
stimuli that penetrate the body by way of the senses. The “battle” that 
is thus waged through the senses is of a fundamentally different nature 
than it was before. While remaining the point of contact between the 
subject and its surroundings, the senses no longer function as an inter-
face separating the subject from the outside world, thus enabling him to 
survey and control it. Instead, the senses are now conceived of as a chan-
nel or door that is continually ajar, through which the outside world 
penetrates the body in the form of stimuli. The balance in the power 
struggle between the subject and the outside world would now seem to 
tip decisively towards the latter.
Some theorists associate this nineteenth and early twentieth century 
concern for the role of sensory impressions in the creation of subjectiv-
ity with the social and technological developments of modernity. As a re-
sult of the industrial revolution, rapid urban expansion, the advance of 
capitalism and the invention of new technologies, the field of the senses 
changed—particularly in the latter half of the nineteenth century—at 
breakneck speed. The subject was increasingly exposed to new sensa-
tions that could no longer be fitted into the familiar world order. There-
fore, in the words of Jonathan Crary, an essential aspect of modernity 
consists of:
a  continual crisis of attentiveness.  .  .  .  the changing configurations of 
capitalism pushing attention and distraction to new limits and thresh-
olds, with an unending introduction of new products, new sources of 
stimulation, and streams of information. (Crary, “Unbinding Vision” 22)
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According to Crary, this “crisis of the senses” is the reason why the 
concept of “attention” became one of the most important categories in the 
empirical psychology of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
The American philosopher and psychologist William James (brother of 
modernist novelist Henry James), for instance, defined the subject in terms 
of attention, concentration or focalization. Precisely at the point when 
the distraction of the subject starts to emerge as a new phenomenon in 
the course of the nineteenth century, he took the concentration and atten-
tion of the subject to be decisive for human subjectivity.
But not everyone sees distraction as a polar opposite of attention or 
concentration, hence, as threatening to the subject. German thinkers such 
as Sigfried Kracauer and Walter Benjamin consider it rather as a liberation 
or emancipation of the subject than as its downfall. In his essay “The Cult 
of Distraction” from 1924, Kracauer tells us how the new media of his time 
such as radio and film bring about an intense form of distraction in the 
viewer or listener. Someone listening to the radio, for instance, will switch 
from one station to another. The idea of the uninterrupted unity of the 
traditional work of art is radically disrupted by the “fragmented sequence 
of splendid sense impressions” that comprises the reception of film. On 
the one hand, these ways of looking and listening are symptomatic of the 
fragmented character of modern life, “deprived of substance, empty as 
a tin can, a life which instead of internal connections knows nothing but 
isolated events forming ever new series of images in the manner of a kalei-
doscope.” On the other hand, Kracauer argued that watching films would 
help to demolish the bourgeois worldview, “making the ‘soul’ flow out of 
itself to become a part of the material world . . . constantly encountering 
material reality” (qtd. in Amstrong 216).
In “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” Walter 
Benjamin presents that over the course of modernity, distraction of the 
viewer-listener becomes less and less the opposite of attention. Rather, 
being distracted is a special form of attention through which entirely dif-
ferent objects penetrate the subject. He compares the effect of cinema 
with Freud’s theory of psychoanalysis, which made it possible to isolate 
matters that hitherto “floated along unnoticed in the broad stream of per-
ception” (235), subjecting them to analysis. The fragmented structure of 
film carries the viewer’s attention with it, and distracts it in the sense that 
at such moments conscious reflection is impossible. In order to illustrate 
this distracted manner of seeing, Benjamin quotes Georges Duhamel, 
who, incidentally, and unlike Benjamin, regarded film as a great danger: 
“I can no longer think what I want to think. My thoughts have been re-
placed by moving images” (qtd. in Benjamin 238). But the discontinuity 
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in the sequence of film images and the “shock” that this brings about in 
the viewer ends up facilitating a “heightened presence of mind”:
The distracted person, too, can form habits. More, the ability to master cer-
tain tasks in a  state of distraction proves that their solution has become 
a matter of habit. Distraction as provided by art presents a covert control of 
the extent to which new tasks have become soluble by apperception. . . . Re-
ception in a state of distraction, which is increasingly noticeable in all fields 
of art and is symptomatic of profound changes in apperception, finds in 
the film its true mode of exercise. The film with its shock effect meets this 
mode of reception halfway. The film makes the cult value recede into the 
background, not only by putting the public in the position of critic, but also 
by the fact that at the movies this position requires no attention. The public 
is an examiner, but an absent-minded one. (Benjamin 240)
At first sight, the “reception in a state of distraction” that Benjamin 
regarded as having been triggered by the new media takes on paradoxical 
forms. Because subjects are no longer capable of organizing and anticipat-
ing their own perceptions, and because they are distracted by discontinu-
ous sensory impressions, they become capable of attaining new or higher 
insights. According to this notion of things, distraction is an element of 
attention, seen as a dialectic apparatus. The subject who gets these new 
insights is, however, not the same subject as the one proposed by the En-
lightenment who acquired insight by means of controlled observation and 
rationality. The subject of modernity acquires insight while being subject-
ed to a mechanical process, unintendedly and accidentally.
The notion of subjectivity in modernity described so far differs radi-
cally from conventional notions of the subject in Modernism. According to 
the conventional view, the modernist subject is not characterized by distrac-
tion, disintegration, loss of self and inability to experience the world, but by 
distanced observation, reserved intellectualism, scepticism and irony, and 
a pursuit of an authentic self.1 These qualities seem to embody a notion of 
strong individualistic subjectivity rather than the loss of it. I will, however, 
rearticulate these two opposed notions of subjectivity as a distinction be-
tween the world-sensitive subjectivity and the defensive subject. But how 
can a strong, individualistic subjectivity be seen as “defensive”?
In order to solve the apparent contradiction between modernity and 
literary modernism, in order to historicize, as well as to argue that the indi-
vidualistic subject is a defensive one, I will invoke one of the most important 
1 See, for example, Fokkema and Ibsch (24).
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and canonical essays written about modernity, and moreover, written in the 
middle of it, in 1903: “The Metropolis and Mental Life” by the German so-
ciologist Georg Simmel. Like Baudelaire before him and Benjamin after him, 
Simmel describes the psychological foundation of metropolitan subjectivity 
as determined by the intensification of emotional life due to the swift and 
continuous shift of external and internal stimuli. “Lasting impressions, the 
slightness in their differences, the habituated regularity of their course and 
contrasts between them, consume, so to speak, less mental energy than the 
rapid telescoping of changing images, pronounced differences within what is 
grasped at a single glance, and the unexpectedness of violent stimuli” (Sim-
mel 325). This metropolitan life stands in sharp contrast to the slower, more 
habitual, more smoothly flowing rhythm of the sensory-mental phase of 
small-town and rural existence.
But the metropolitan subject does not just let itself be annihilated by 
these violent stimuli. It has its defense mechanisms:
Thus the metropolitan type—which naturally takes on a  thousand in-
dividual modifications—creates a protective organ for itself against the 
profound disruption with which the fluctuations and discontinuities of 
the external milieu threaten it. Instead of reacting emotionally, the met-
ropolitan type reacts primarily in a rational manner, thus creating a men-
tal predominance through the intensification of consciousness, which 
in turn is caused by it. Thus the reaction of the metropolitan person to 
those events is moved to a sphere of mental activity, which is least sensi-
tive, and which is furthest removed from the depths of the personality. 
(Simmel 325)
Simmel sees the intellectualistic character of the mental life of the met-
ropolitan subject as a protection of the inner life against the sovereign pow-
ers of the metropolis. Yet, it is not only its intellectualism but also its reserve 
which protects the subject from being overwhelmed by modern urban life:
If the unceasing external contact of numbers of persons in the city 
should be met by the same number of inner reactions as in the small 
town, in which one knows almost every person he meets and to each 
of whom he has a positive relationship, one would be completely at-
omised internally and would fall into an unthinkable mental condition. 
(Simmel 331)
According to Simmel, it is because of the lack of space and bodily closeness 
in the dense crowds of the metropolis that mutual reserve, indifference and 
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the intellectual conditions of life become perceivable and significant for the 
first time.
Simmel’s diagnosis of mental life in the metropolis does resolve the 
contradiction between notions of modernity as, on the one hand, being 
defined by a crisis of the senses (Crary) or by traumatic shock and the 
dissolution of experience (Baer), and, on the other hand, literary mod-
ernism as it is seen by mainstream criticism. Both distanced observation, 
reserved intellectualism, scepticism, irony and the pursuit of authenticity 
that characterizes literary modernism in conventional construction of it, 
as well as the world-sensitive modernism as distinguished by Benjamin, 
are a protection against the loss of self which threatens the subject living 
under the conditions of modernity. This implies a reversal of the kind of 
relation between the features of literary modernism and history as pos-
tulated by Fokkema and Ibsch, two Dutch scholars who have written on 
literary modernism. For them, the independent intellectualism and reserve 
of the modernist subject is not a defense strategy, but the foundation of 
individual subjectivity as such. They explain, for instance, the allegedly 
marginal role of the events of the First World War in Thomas Mann’s Der 
Zauberberg and in Virginia Woolf ’s To the Lighthouse as follows:
In the Modernist world of experience, everything, even the events of 
war, is filtered by consciousness; historical events are made subordinate 
to the vision of the pondering, evaluating subject, which will never give 
up its independence. (Fokkema and Ibsch 34, my translation)
However, when we try to understand modernism contextually, instead 
of formalistically, it becomes necessary to conclude that it is not a matter 
of holding on to independence, as if wilfully, but of armouring the self 
by means of intellectualism and reserve against overwhelming threats to 
it. This is what I meant above by a defensive identity. It will be clear by 
now that this armouring of the self does not safeguard the self. The Aus-
trian modernist writer Herman Broch articulates clearly why modernist 
intellectualism is compulsive instead of controlled: “The highly-developed 
rationality of modern metropolitan culture does not at all mitigate the hu-
man twilight, rather it intensifies it. The accepted ratio becomes a mere 
means for the satisfaction of drives and thus is robbed of its content as 
knowledge of the whole” (qtd. in Miller 40). According to Tyrus Miller, 
rationality had embarked on a  journey to the end of the night (alluding 
to the title of Louis-Ferdinand Céline’s 1932 novel), namely, reducing the 
individual subject to, in Beckett’s words, “a peristalsis of light, worming 
its way into the dark” (Miller 40). This is a far cry from the triumphant 
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rational subject to which critics tend to cling. But it is also an overcoming 
of the split alleged by critics more sensitive to other kinds of modernist 
literature and art, the kinds that can now be considered more daring, look-
ing the condition of modernity more directly in the face.2
These transformations of the perceptual field and the subsequent rise 
of new, modernist subjectivities can also inflect and enrich our understand-
ing of Munch’s painting. Rather than commenting on specific paintings, 
I will reflect more generally on his style. Munch has sometimes been con-
sidered as not modern enough because although there is always a tension 
between figuration and abstraction in his works, he remained committed 
to the “traditional” mode of figuration (Prelinger 156). The turn to ab-
straction was seductive to many artists of his generation; Munch, however, 
never fully embraced that style of painting. The way Munch’s abstract ges-
tures or elements of his paintings are usually read is as expressive, not de-
picting an object or figure, but expressing the sensibility of the artist. This 
sensibility can then be read in the moving gestures of paint.
In the conventional account of abstract painting, abstraction is the 
binary opposite of figuration. When painting is purified from figuration, 
abstraction is the result. It is usually Mondrian’s development that is used 
to exemplify this binary notion of abstraction as purification and that con-
structs abstraction as the radical other of figuration. Since then, different, 
less binary conceptions of abstraction have been brought up. In her study 
on Munch, Emma and Edvard Looking Sideways, Mieke Bal proposes to 
consider figuration and abstraction not as opposing modes of painting, but 
as modes of painting which are in dialogue (201). The abstract elements 
in Munch’s works signify gesture; gestures that visualize the work of the 
painter as painterly realization of the work. With this foregrounding of 
the notion of gesture, she turns to a  specifically gesture- and painting-
oriented figural element, the hand. She argues about Munch’s painting The 
Wedding of the Bohemian the following: “We have seen the one [hand] of 
the bride in The Wedding of the Bohemian, a bit of surface at the extremity 
of an equally poorly painted arm, the point of which was not depiction but 
signifying gesture” (200). She reads the poorly painted hands in Self-Por-
trait with Bottles (1938) in a similar way: “In this work I submit, it serves 
primarily to indicate the work of the hand with pigment and brush—art’s 
material relations as never to be overlooked, which might happen when 
we focus too narrowly on the depiction” (203). The kind of dialogue be-
tween depiction and abstraction Bal describes assigns different semiotic 
2 This account of subjectivity and distraction was based on my earlier article, 
“Figurations of Self: Modernism and Distraction” (339–46).
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functions to depiction and abstraction. Depiction represents figures and 
objects, whereas abstraction signifies gestures and the painterly realization 
of the work. In Munch’s works both painterly functions are always com-
bined, although the degrees in them can differ.
Bal also refers to Jonathan Crary’s work on modernity and attention 
in order to see what the repercussions of his view are on abstraction: “Ab-
straction in this sense is a lack of attention. The paradoxical consequence 
is a distraction from the motif to the painterly realisation. This figural dis-
traction leads to attention to the paint for its own sake; to materiality” 
(209). I would like to suggest another reading of the role of abstraction 
in Munch’s work in view of the distraction I have analyzed so far. In this 
reading, the lack of attention does not lead us away from depiction but 
qualifies another kind of depiction. Munch illuminates how, as moderni-
ty caused fundamental changes in the perceptual field, figuration was no 
longer focused on the depiction of figures and objects, but on the depiction 
of the perception of figures and objects. It is these perceptions of figures 
and objects that, with modernity, become “distracted.” The depiction of 
distracted perceptions is given form by means of abstraction. Distrac-
tion, then, does not imply a displacement from figuration to abstraction, 
but inserts a self-reflexive moment or gesture, into the process of figura-
tion. One does not paint the object world, but the way one sees the object 
world—distractedly.
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